Monthly Archives: April 2013

The Ulster Volunteers 1913

THE ULSTER VOLUNTEERS 1913

A standard snaps in the winter air
There’s a strident bugle call
No time to chatter or concur
Nor waiver or forestall
With backs like rods and shoulders square
And proud heads held on high
A militia then beyond compare
The Volunteers march by.

Formed by need and requisite
To face Erin’s shameful ruse
To stand as one and hold the gun
The option theirs to choose
From country lanes and streets so poor
To men of great renown
In circumstance this one last chance
To fight and serve the Crown.

From all compass points and in between
They rallied to the shout
They signed in blood and swore they would
Drive disloyal rebels out
Defiant lines in treacherous times
Our first rank of attack
Bold men avowed to be allowed
To force dissenters back.

With colours raised and orders gave
With resolve and fortitude
With strength of mind and purpose
Their business to conclude
To set in stone a promise
That will last a hundred years
Don’t forget but remember yet
The Ulster Volunteers.

Beano

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Republicans should remember Thatcher’s contribution to Peace.

This piece first appeared on www.openunionism.com

Sammy McNally is an itinerant Fenian scribbler… and a fictional prod character bestowed upon us by James Young. He has previously written for other blogs such as BangorDub, Three Thousand Versts and Slugger O’Toole. He describes his politics as “Republican lite”.

It is highly likely that Margaret Thatcher’s name will crop up at the Sinn Fein Ard Fheis, but highly unlikely that any pleasant words will be uttered by any delegates and even less likely that Gerry et al will mention that part of her legacy – support for low corporation tax – that has made its way into SF economic policy.

What will be discussed, of course, will be the hunger strikes, and as someone who supported the hunger strikers I think it fair to say that even from Thatcher’s point of view (which was more or less the same as the majority of Unionist opinion) –. that the hunger strikers had to be defeated and isolated as ‘terrorists’ rather than reconciled  – her policy failed, and the fall out arguably turned SF into a credible political force which in turn perhaps inevitably and eventually led them into government in Northern Ireland.

But Thatcher, the bête noire of Irish republicans, also signed the Anglo-Irish Agreement, which arguably made peace possible years later. On reflection Nationalists, and indeed Unionists and Irish Republicans, should give her credit for that (although perhaps not publicly). Just as with David Trimble years later with the Good Friday Agreement, Thatcher did the necessary ‘heavy lifting’.

She was a formidable and principled political opponent to Irish republicanism who sought to defend her ‘own’ country against a determined ‘insurgency’ and she played a significant role, both intentionally an unintentionally, in bringing about what seems to have turned out as ‘peace’. She should be viewed in that considered perspective, rather than through the lens of emotional self-indulgence which is bring so over-used by her opponents and detractors.

When we move off Ireland to Britain and the economy, the levels of hypocrisy from trendy, lefty bandwagon-ing ‘socialists’ sitting pretty in post-Thatcher Britain is running on overdrive as they seek to vilify her at the same time as hypocritical Tories (who stabbed her in the back) seek to deify her. It seems there is little chance of Thatcher’s legacy being considered simply on its merits.

So far, a quality debate. Not.

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Roy Garland: Irish News:What Agenda?

Once again Roy Garland the fifth columnist of Unionism, has raised his head above the Alliance party parapet to denigrate the Loyalist Working Class, for the satisfaction of his gluttonous Republican audience.

By means of his column this week in the Irish News, 12/4/13, he likens the behaviour of the defenders of the National Standard, to the behaviour displayed by the IRA terrorists and Republicans who recently fired a volley of shots beside a Republican mural, and paraded very young Children as mini IRA terrorists.

He denigrates Ruth Patterson, for having the honesty to remind the IRA representatives on Belfast City Council of the IRAs sordid, murderous past.

He praises the woolly headed Alliance party, for producing another one of their totally predictable head in the sand amendments of appeasement, in support of their Republican partners on the council, who had refused to respectfully mark, the barbaric slaughter of the two British corporals David Howes and Derek Woods.

This is the same woolly headed Alliance party, which recently supported the rainbow coloured lighting up of the city hall, to celebrate the flaunting of homosexual behaviour.

It is the same woolly headed Alliance party, which then bizarrely opposed the lighting up of the City Hall on Rememberance day, in honour of the Soldiers who sacrificed their lives to ensure the defeat of Hitler and Nazi Germany. Thereby ensuring that homosexuals would be free to flaunt their homosexuality, without fear of execution.

He questions Christopher Stalford for having the honesty and moral decency to distinguish between, the totally innocent victims of terrorism and victims of their own indiscriminate terrorist activities and support of terrorism.     Roy Garland suggests that, the Loyalists who democratically defied the belligerent British Government in 1912, by unanimously supporting and signing the Ulster Covenant in defence of the democratic right of the Ulster People, to decide their own future, were just as guilty of illegality as the indiscriminate murdering terrorists, who  have sought to usurp democracy by barbaric slaughter.

He then finish’s his attack with a plug for his preferred method of election, the wishy washy , if, possibly, maybe, depends what way the winds blowing, Modified Borda Count, as an alternative to decent, honest, straight forward democracy.

This would then of course mean that, the self-righteous elitists of the Alliance party and Roy Girvan could just ignore the results, when they fail to  correspond with their own self-righteous minority opinion of what we, who they consider to be the ignorant Loyalist Working Class lowest common denominators,  really should have voted for.      Which is exactly the attitude they adopted when, the Modified Borda Count system which was used by the Equality Commission with regard to the Flying of the National Standard, resulted in overwhelming support for the status quo.

Charlie Freel.

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The Murder of a 12 Year Old Boy: Bobby Cosgrove

Horrible Murder of a 12-year-old Boy. 

 

Throughout the history of Belfast there have been many harrowing crimes, but the killing of a child still remains the most sickening crime of them all, the following story was one of the cruelest that took place in Ballymacarrett.

 

 

Our story begins when on a fine August morning in 1897 when Mrs Isabella Dyer was sitting at the front of her home at 118 Dee Street, she was waiting for her husband to return home of the nightshift at the near by shipyards. She noticed a very frightened young boy coming up the street and as he approached her door she noticed that he was very worried and ragged looking.  She took the boy in and give him some breakfast and then washed and cleaned him up. It was while she was doing this she discovered that he had run away from home and was sleeping rough in the Victoria Park.  She also noticed that the lad had a large number of bruises on his arms and body. Read more »

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Bobby Cosgrove: Local Historian: East Belfast

Bobby Cosgrove is an East Belfast man–born and raised in the Willowfield area.  He has a vast historical knowledge of that area and has a particular interest in the period around the First World War.  He has written many articles on all aspects of life in the East of the City and is in great demand throughout the country to share his stories..  In the coming weeks longkeshinsideout plan to print some of those stories here.  Some will be about everyday life in Belfast in the years gone by–there will be reminisces from his own childhood–tales of the myriad of characters from years gone by and others from a historical perspective dating back a hundred years or more.  Hopefully some of the articles we upload will reach a new audience and give Bobby the coverage he deserves.

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Sensible Socialism to move the PUL Community Forward.

In his latest chapter on the ideology of New Loyalism, former Blanket columnist and Radical Unionist commentator, DR JOHN COULTER, outlines his principles of sensible socialism as a basis to move the PUL community forward.

 

If New Loyalism is to give constructive leadership to the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist (PUL) community, then it must adopt the policy of sensible socialism.

Likewise, New Loyalism cannot afford to limit itself to the Protestant working class. Like the Loyal Orders, New Loyalism must expand well beyond the urban loyalist housing estates and into the Unionist middle and upper classes.

Strategy-wise, New Loyalism must accomplish within the PUL community what Provisional Sinn Fein has achieved within the Catholic community. To eclipse the moderate nationalist SDLP, Provisional Sinn Fein rebranded itself as the voice of ‘responsible republicanism’, fooling tens of thousands of traditional middle class SDLP Catholic voters that it was a party of peace rather than the apologists for ‘an IRA war’.

 

Read more »

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The ACT Initiative – North Down

From violence to peace… and now making a real difference in the community

Jason Boyd meets the ex-paramilitary members who have worked hard to find their place in modern Newtownards society Read more »

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SHOCK!!!…HORROR!!!…GERRY ADAMS and the word TRUTH in the same sentence.

In a column in last nights Belfast Telegraph–Thursday 11th April-Gerry Adams–IRA man–former Sinn Fein president and current TD for County Louth, gives an opinion on how governments have failed to honour obligations on crucial issues. His take on the GFA 15 years on is that we have “stable power sharing arrangements and political institutions that are working and continue to enjoy popular support”.  Arrangements being the operative word here.  What we have all these years later is certainly an arrangement–one between the $inners–who beforehand were totally opposed to administering British rule, but obviously dont have a problem now after they have discovered how lucrative it can be–and The Dupe$-who collectivelly would sell their souls to the devil–or highest bidder-an arrangement that is very cosy and will see both sets of lovers tucked up in that King sized bed that is Stormont for the forseeable future.
Adams continues in a similar vein where basically he copper fastens the old tenet”Dont let the truth get in the way of a good yarn”.  On this occasion he would have us believe that the Good Friday Agreement and the subsequent events since have given us ” an example of how deep rooted conflicts can be resolved”.  You’re having a laugh Gerry?  What the GFA and its aftermath has delivered to the already beleagured working class areas throughout Northern Ireland is more of the same and in many cases worse doses of it.  Can we honestly say that post GFA that we are less sectarian than we were?  That we are less suspicious of the “other side”?  Flags issues–the perennial parading issues–accusations of discriminatory tactics by ” both sides”–acute polarisation within the working classes–and particularly from protestant/unionist working class claims of being misled by elected representatives and of feeling disenfranchised.  Working class areas throughout Northern Ireland and Belfast in particular are most assuredly no better off than they were a decade and a half ago–despite what Mr. Adams says.  Perhaps if we are told something often enough then we will believe it.  Gerry argues that since the agreement Unionist leadership has sought to minimise the implementation of the agreement whilst republicans have argued for maximum implementation. When it suits Gerry.  He blaims failures of both British and Irish governments to implement certain issues–a Bill of Rights for instance.  For the north of Ireland he says..not Northern Ireland where his party help administer British rule.  And pointedly he also asks that issues such as an independent inquiry into Pat Finucanes death should be addressed along with the abuse of human rights–quoting examples like martin Corey and Marion Price–nut unashamedly leaving out clerical abuse–I wonder why–or the ongoing witch hunt by the HET inpursuit of elderly loyalist ex combatants.  But as always in good stories the best is left to last.  The punch line if you like.  I quote…” But it is in respect of a victim centered truth and reconciliation process that much work still needs to be done”.  Yes..he wants an Independent International Truth Commission set up where governments and ex combatants need to be part of the process.  Their can be no heriarchy of victims he says.  And you know what Gerry?  Virtually every reader would agree with all of these sentiments.  That is if they thought you were genuine and not lying through your bushy beard.  Lead by example on this  Gerry….start telling the truth on matters such as membership of the IRA—your continuing role as a senior figure in the Army Council long after the ceasefires and GFA—your involvement in atrocities like La Mon and Bloody Sunday–your role as chief judge/jury/executioner in the saga of the so called disappeared.  Hold your hands up to the McConville family and tell the TRUTH around the disappearence of their mother over 40 years ago.  Until you do it is highly unlikely that anyone in this country could give any credibility to you even uttering the word.

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The Volunteer: Anonymous

I was reading some poetry this morning and John Baileys poem The Volunteer urged me to write this little ode and it’s fitting due to the 100th Anniversary of the Formation of the UVF.

UVF & RHC Volunteers

Its been 100 years since the first falling in

And the call for volunteers did begin

Since then things have changed and conflicts have gone by

Yet still if we’re called we would still prepare to die

Years later the call for support came again

And new volunteers gave their lives without asking for gain

We secretly hope that none of us will fall

And our comrades don’t read our names on a wall

The damned politicians they don’t truly know

About the hurt they have caused in their “Ulster Says NO”

And for our family who can only just sit and pray

Please don’t volunteer please don’t leave us today

They don’t blame us for going as well they might

As the wardens lead us away they promise to write

Comrades reassure family that we will be well

But we all know our family will travel through hell

We never asked for richness for the service we give

Just a nice peaceful Ulster where we all could live

But if this time around Im the one that should fall

Just head round the corner and read my name from the wall

Anonymous

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Book Review from London School of Economics.

Book Review: Defending the Realm? The Politics of Britains Small Wars Since 1945

Aaron Edwards 

Britain is often revered for its extensive experience of waging ‘small wars’. Its long imperial history is littered with high profile counter-insurgency campaigns, thus marking it out as the world’s most seasoned practitioner of this type of warfare. In Defending the Realm? Aaron Edwards details the tactical and operational dynamics of Britain’s small wars, arguing that the military’s use of force was more heavily constrained by wider strategic and political considerations than previously admitted. Andrew Holt finds a concise, readable text that should be of interest to students and scholars of British foreign policy, international relations, and security studies.

Defending the Realm? The Politics of Britain’s Small Wars Since 1945. Aaron Edwards. Manchester University Press. December 2012.

Find this book: amazon-logo

In March 2003, British forces joined a US-led coalition in invading Iraq. Within a month President Saddam Hussein had been toppled. However, it was not until 2009 that British combat troops pulled out of the country, with the situation following the pattern of many other ‘small wars’. These conflicts, typically clandestine in nature and fought against non-state actors, “have been an integral part of British military experience for hundreds of years” (p. 2). They were particularly prominent for the United Kingdom in the aftermath of World War II as decolonisation progressed. Thus, as we mark the tenth anniversary of the beginning of the Iraq War, and with British troops finally on the verge of withdrawal from Afghanistan following the conflict that began in October 2001, now is an opportune moment to examine the contemporary historical record of Britain’s small wars.

In his new book, Aaron Edwards focuses on the strategic dimension of these conflicts, paying particular attention to relations between civilian and military leaders. The first five chapters consider colonial operations in Palestine, Malaya, Kenya, Cyprus and Aden respectively. Malaya is of particular interest. This campaign has often been highlighted as an example of how to successfully fight an asymmetrical war, yet it was far from an unmitigated success. Indeed, Edwards shows how “failure was only narrowly averted” thanks to the actions of the colonial government’s reorganisation of civil and military leadership (pp. 61–62). In contrast, “in terms of civil-military relations, Aden was an unmitigated failure” (p. 179) with Lt Col Colin Mitchell (‘Mad Mitch’) at the centre of events after leading the reoccupation of Crater in July 1967.

Closer to home, Edwards demonstrates how, despite its “intellectual reservoir of colonial experience”, “the Army was woefully unprepared for operations in Northern Ireland” (p. 193). This chapter is particularly comprehensive, no doubt benefiting from the author’s earlier research on Ulster. Taking place on home soil, the troubles represent a very different small war. There was the added complication of coordinating with the police, which was eased by 1977 by the ultimate emergence of police primacy. Managing the gap between London’s strategic lead and tactics on the ground also proved difficult, with ‘Mad Mitch’ warned of just this in the House of Commons after his election in 1970.

The final two chapters are somewhat different. The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are too recent for the full range of archival sources to be available, though the author does make use of the material declassified as part of the Chilcot Inquiry. Both missions were also notable in the sense that Britain was part of a coalition, and eventually also had to liaise with a host nation. The chapter on Afghanistan would benefit from being from being a little longer, though it does highlight issues of political interference. On Iraq, Edwards is at times particularly damning, arguing that “Despite the dedication and professionalism of the armed forces in implementing government policy, the politicians failed the soldiers” (p. 252). Planning was rushed and hidden, with the Chief of the Defence Staff even prevented by the Defence Secretary from liaising with the Chief of Defence Logistics for fear that, if leaked, knowledge of such a meeting could damage the negotiations taking place at the UN.

Each case study engages the relevant literature and shows how lessons from earlier missions were applied – or not, as the case may be. Indeed, “it is the tendency to identify the wrong lessons that has often spelt disaster for Britain” (p. 267). Knowledge gained from Northern Ireland was misapplied in Iraq; the reasons for success in Malaya and elsewhere not suitably considered in Afghanistan. The importance of intelligence is another common theme, and is highlighted and elucidated very well. Again, lessons were sometimes learnt slowly. Structural problems of intelligence were identified in Aden despite its importance in Malaya, while intelligence failures were also partly responsible for the events of Bloody Sunday.

The book provides an excellent overview of a number of significant case studies, showing how “The initial absence of an overarching end goal has been the signature piece of most of Britain’s ‘small wars’” (p. 247). It is well-informed by the literature of strategic studies, but also handles an array of historical source material expertly. Government documents and the collections of private papers are supplemented by interviews with soldiers who saw active service. While acknowledging British successes where appropriate it concludes that “Britain has typically misapplied force against its irregular opponents in the short term, before, finally, re-calibrating its approach for success in the long term” (p. 288). The book is concise, readable and should be of interest to students and scholars of British foreign policy, international relations and security studies.

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