Patricia Lundy’s research interests are in the study of post-conflict transition, ‘dealing with the past’, contested memories and the legacy of human rights abuses. She has studied unofficial community-based ‘story’\/ ‘truth recovery processes and official police-led historical enquiries.<\/p>\n
She is particularly interested in ‘truth’ recovery and ‘bottom-up’ participatory approaches. In collaboration with Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT), she co-authored a Northern Ireland wide survey on ‘Attitudes Towards a Truth Commission for NI’ (2006) Her most recent research is an in-depth study of the Historical Enquiries Team (HET) police Service Northern Ireland (PSNI).The HET is an innovative police-led initiative which breaks new ground in transitional justice and offers lessons internationally.<\/p>\n
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The project also involves interviews with victims and their assessment of the HET process. She was awarded a British Academy Large Grant (2007\/8) and the Leverhulme Senior Research Fellowship (2009\/10) to undertake the research. Her work has been published in a wide range of journals including Sociology, Law and Society, International Journal of Transitional Justice, Law and Social Challenges and Contemporary social Science.<\/p>\n
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\u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n DR PATRICIA LUNDY <\/strong><\/p>\n UNIVERSITY OF ULSTER<\/strong><\/p>\n 2nd<\/sup> APRIL 2012<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n RESEARCH BRIEF: ASSESSMENT OF HET REVIEW PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES IN ROYAL MILITARY POLICE INVESTIGATION CASES<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n INTRODUCTION<\/strong><\/p>\n This paper examines the HET\u2019s review processes and procedures in Royal Military Police (RMP) investigation cases (hereafter RMP cases). RMP cases involve the fatal shooting of over 150 civilians by the British army between 1970 and September 1973.[1]<\/a> In November 2011 the HET had completed 36 RMP case reports.[2]<\/a> This paper sets out research findings based on the analysis of twenty-four HET reports, relating to seventeen individual RMP cases.[3]<\/a>\u00a0 As discussed later, there are frequently multiple drafts of reports. The paper focuses on an \u2018independent team\u2019 set up by the HET to examine all RMP cases. The team is made up of retired police officers from outside<\/span> Northern Ireland. A number of issues, about the way in which the HET conducts investigations in RMP cases, are considered. Of particular note are apparent anomalies and inconsistencies in the investigation process where State agencies (in this case the military) are involved, compared to non-state or paramilitary suspects.\u00a0 This raises questions about the ability of the HET to undertake independent, impartial, effective investigations in cases involving State agencies.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n BACKGROUND <\/strong><\/p>\n The HET was presented to the Committee of Ministers by the UK government as part of a \u2018package of measures\u2019 which professes to fulfill its obligations under Article 2 of the ECHR. Article 2 requires an independent, effective, prompt and sufficiently transparent investigation into deaths implicating State agencies.[4]<\/a> The Court has specified that with respect to cases involving State agencies, those responsible for deaths must be made properly accountable. In order to attain accountability, an investigation must be effective. Any deficiency in the investigation process, which undermines this, is unlikely to comply with Article 2 standards.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n With this in mind, the paper examines the following aspects of HET investigation processes in RMP cases:<\/p>\n <\/p>\n CONTEXT<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n The Saville Inquiry revealed that between 1970 and September 1973 an informal agreement (hereafter Agreement) existed between the Chief Constable of the RUC and the GOC of the British army about the conduct of investigations in fatal shootings involving the military.[5]<\/a> The Agreement specified that soldiers suspected of involvement in a fatal shooting episode would be questioned by the Special Investigations Branch (SIB) of the Royal Military Police (RMP); and the RUC would take responsibility for interviewing civilian witnesses and all other aspects of the investigation. These arrangements meant that soldiers involved in fatal shooting incidents were rarely interviewed by the RUC and consequently any opportunity for independence was negated. An RUC policy at the time directed that the RUC should forward all available evidence to the RMP prior to an interview taking place with soldiers.[6]<\/a> In effect the RMP rarely received witness statements before military personnel were interviewed. The interviews appear to have been conducted informally with no assessment of criminal responsibility. The role of the RMP officer seems to have been simply to record the facts as described by the soldier, rather than to probe or question with a view to ascertaining whether or not the action had been justified or whether the soldiers\u2019 actions were lawful. The procedure appears to have been to question soldiers as witnesses, rather than to interrogate them as suspects, thereby dispensing with the need for formal cautions. The adequacy of RMP investigations was examined in the Saville Inquiry; the following evidence from a military witness captures the statement-taking process: \u201cIt was not a formal procedure. I always wore civilian clothing and the soldier was usually relaxed. We usually discussed the incident over sandwiches and tea.\u201d<\/em>[7]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In 2003 these arrangements were judicially reviewed in the Kathleen Thompson case.[8]<\/a> Sir Brian Kerr, Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, concluded that investigation into Mrs Thompson\u2019s death was not effective and it is questionable whether the Chief Constable of the RUC had the legal authority to delegate the critical responsibility of interviewing soldiers to the RMP.\u00a0 It is worth quoting at length what Sir Brian Kerr LCJ stated, \u201c\u2026the soldier who effectively discharged the shot which caused the death of Mrs Thompson and those who were with him at the time were interviewed by a member of the Royal Military Police. I do not consider that this satisfied the duty imposed on the police at the time to properly investigate this fatal shooting.\u00a0 In my view it was not open to them to delegate that critical responsibility to another agency such as the Royal Military Police.\u00a0 Quite apart from that however, the fact that each of the interviews cannot have lasted any more than half an hour; the fact that clear discrepancies appear in the statements made, discrepancies which have not been the subject of further challenge or investigation, are sufficient to demonstrate the inadequacy of the investigation into the death of the deceased\u2026 By any standard it is clear that the investigation into the death of Mrs Thompson was not effective\u2026 He went on to say, \u201ceven allowing for the constraints that might have obtained at the time and the difficulty in visiting the locus where the shooting happened, I am satisfied that a more rigorous examination than in fact took place ought to have occurred.\u00a0 It is therefore clearly demonstrated by the applicant that this investigation was not adequate\u201d. This raises concerns about the appropriateness of more than 150 RMP investigations conducted under the above impugned arrangements, which are currently under review by the HET. [9]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In June 2007, a number of human rights NGOs and legal representatives held a meeting with senior HET management to discuss unsatisfactory review reports in a number of RMP cases and other related matters.[10]<\/a> The HET accepted that it \u2018had dropped the ball\u2019 and acknowledged deficiencies in the reports. It was agreed that all completed and concluded RMP case reports, which had been forwarded to families, would be recalled. HET further agreed that future reviews would take into account the ineffectiveness of RMP original investigations and this would be reflected\/ acknowledged in reports to families.\u00a0 A form of words to this effect was proposed by an NGO in a position paper. This is an important point; the HET has been commended for revealing inadequacies in RMP investigations in its reports.[11]<\/a> It is not clear why the HET did not include this crucial information in earlier reviews, despite the information being in the public domain.[12]<\/a> As discussed later, the reports subsequently completed differ significantly in content and conclusions; and a form of apology is offered by some individual soldiers. The subject of tracing was also raised. The HET accepted that it had limited success in identifying, tracing and interviewing suspects and witnesses in RMP cases and acknowledged that this had the potential to undermine public confidence in the HET. Up to that point only one soldier had been identified, traced and interviewed by HET. Assurances were given that procedures would be reassessed.[13]<\/a>\u00a0 Internal documents written after the above HET\/NGO meeting reveal considerable debate over identifying, tracing and interviewing military personnel. The following was stated in one such document, \u201cthe HET needs to ensure that any policy change does not have a detrimental impact on our relations with the MOD\u2026 not only in terms of day-to-day co-operation but also public disquiet.\u201d[14]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The HET subsequently set up a \u2018special independent team\u2019 to deal with all RMP cases. The independent team<\/span> is made up of retired police officers from outside<\/span> Northern Ireland. This is the context to the current briefing paper.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n CURRENT POSITION<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n Independence<\/strong><\/p>\n Previous research by the author raised a number of concerns generally about the independence of the HET and the role of retired RUC officers.[15]<\/a> While the issue of independence is extremely important, it is not the main focus of this current briefing paper. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the HET has recently undergone significant changes to its processes and structural relationship with the PSNI. From 2009 HET refers cases (where realistic evidential opportunities exist) back to the Serious Crime branch (\u201cC2\u201d) of the Crime Operations Department. This raises a number of concerns which are reflected in a joint submission by the Committee on the Administration of Justice (CAJ) and Pat Finucane Centre (PFC) to the Committee of Ministers (CM) February 2012.[16]<\/a> The submission expressed deep concern that since CM assessment of the general measures in 2009[17]<\/sup><\/sup><\/a> a number of developments significantly undermine the HET\u2019s capacity to carry out the work it was deemed capable of doing. Concerns were expressed about the independence and effectiveness of the process underpinning reports prepared by the HET. Whilst some families have received a satisfactory measure of resolution from the HET, CAJ and PFC do not accept that it is an operationally independent unit of the PSNI and have some concerns about HET\u2019s capacity to conduct effective independent Article 2 compliant investigations where state actors may have been involved in a death. It was noted that without reference to such limitations the HET could be promoted as a model for other Council of Europe states. The submission further stated that \u201cit would be premature for the Committee to close its examination of the issues addressed in Interim Resolution CM\/ResDH(2007)73\u201d and \u201cformally requested the reopening of scrutiny by the Committee of Ministers of General Measures relating to the HET in the \u2018McKerr group of cases\u2019.\u201d [18]<\/a><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n HET Investigation Practices and Procedures: <\/strong><\/p>\n HET has a number of processes and procedures that it adopts in RMP cases.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The \u2018pragmatic approach\u2019 refers to HET interviews of suspects conducted \u2018informally\u2019 or not<\/span> under caution. The soldier is interviewed as a witness, rather than cross-examined as a suspect, thereby dispensing with the need for formal caution. The \u2018pragmatic approach\u2019 appears to be a recent development in HET procedures and as far as can be established is specific to RMP cases.[19]<\/a> The HET has stated that, \u2018the methods used for identification, tracing and interviewing military personnel are the same as those employed by the police service\u2019; RMP cases are \u2018treated as per the guidelines of the Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order\u2019.[20]<\/a> There are very clear codes of conduct and standards that govern criminal investigations. The research indicates that the HET appears to have departed from the accepted standards in RMP cases. It is not within the scope of this briefing paper to detail numerous examples; the following abstracts from recent HET reports are illustrative.[21]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u201cThe question as to whether the HET should interview soldiers who were involved in shooting incidents whilst on duty in Northern Ireland is considered on a \u2018case by case\u2019 basis. Usually, but not exclusively, the determining factor will be around the thoroughness of the original investigation, especially the way in which interviews were conducted by the military, and whether the original interviewers had prior knowledge of any allegations that may have been levelled against the soldiers. Another major consideration is the evidence that was tendered by the soldiers or their representatives at the inquest, and most importantly whether there is any evidence available now that would not have been available to investigators at the time.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n The HET report goes on to acknowledge the inefficient original RMP investigation in this particular case.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u201cVery careful consideration was given in this case to re-interviewing soldiers \u2018A\u2019 and \u2018B\u2019 under caution. Crucial aspects of the case, albeit known to investigating authorities at the time, were apparently not used to challenge the versions of events given by the soldiers. The account given by the various civilian witnesses (which are at odds with what soldier \u2018A\u2019 said) is a prime example.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In spite of this, the HET report goes on to offer justification for adopting the \u2018pragmatic approach\u2019:<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u201cIt is the view of the HET that but for the fact that the Chief Crown solicitor at the time determined that the actions of soldier \u2018A\u2019 did not amount to criminal negligence\u2026, the re-interviewing of soldier \u2018A\u2019 under caution would have been appropriate.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n The HET report goes on to say, \u201cthis pragmatic approach was adopted specifically to give the HET maximum opportunity to obtain as much information as possible for the benefit of [the] family. People who are interviewed under caution as \u2018suspects\u2019 are typically either extremely guarded in what they say, or exercise their right not to say anything at all.\u201d<\/strong>\u00a0 [Emphasis added].<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n In a number of cases the HET were unable to identify and trace soldiers responsible for the fatal shooting of civilians and\/or key military eyewitnesses.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n In some instances, where soldiers have been identified and traced, ill health is a factor in the decision not to interview the suspect under caution or otherwise.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n In one instance the HET state that the suspect (soldier B) \u201cis suffering from dementia and a heart condition and was unable to assist with the review.\u201d But the report goes on to give some limited detail about an interview that seems to have taken place; including soldier B\u2019s expression of regret.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Importantly, it is evident that the verification of illness (i.e. medical evidence) of soldiers directly involved in fatal shootings in RMP cases is not<\/span> always confirmed and\/or sought by the HET. The process involved is not transparent.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n It was confirmed in a recent meeting with Dave Cox (HET Director) and other senior staff that the HET do not always seek verification of illness with regards to soldiers directly involved in fatal shootings in RMP cases (i.e. medical evidence).[22]<\/a> In addition, further evidence is provided by a member of the legal profession who recently received written confirmation from the HET that medical evidence was not sought in his client\u2019s (RMP) case which involved the death of an eleven year old boy (copy of letter on file with the author).<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n Issues to be considered include: <\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n In RMP cases where soldiers are interviewed under caution the investigation processes and procedures also raise a number of concerns.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/strong><\/p>\n The HET states in RMP case reports that, \u201cthere is a legal obligation placed upon the HET to serve on those representing an interviewee a pre-interview disclosure package. This consists of all existing evidential documentation and other material that is relevant to the case.\u201d<\/em> [24]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n In response to a FOI request about pre-interview disclosure the HET made the following points; \u201cWhere the HET decides to interview after caution (as a potential suspect) the lawyers who represent them make it clear that they require pre-interview disclosure of all relevant material held by the HET so that they can properly advise their clients, especially as the events in question happened, in some cases, over 40 years ago.\u201d [25]<\/strong><\/a><\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n The FOI response goes on to say; \u201cUnder the Criminal procedures and Investigations Act 1996, the HET is under no obligation to reveal the prosecution case to the suspect or their legal representative before questioning begins.<\/strong> However, the Court of Appeal has held that if the police do not provide sufficient information<\/strong> to enable a solicitor properly to advise his client, the solicitor is entitled to advise his client to refuse to answer questions under caution.\u201d [26]<\/strong><\/a> [Emphasis added]<\/em><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/em><\/p>\n It would appear that the HET has taken, in some cases, a very wide interpretation of \u2018sufficient information\u2019.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Importantly, there is evidence to indicate that the \u2018package\u2019 includes contemporary or new witness<\/span> statements made by individuals who witnessed the death\/incident but did not make a statement to the police at the time. It is my understanding that the witnesses, the families, NGOs and\/or lawyers who enabled the new witnesses to come forward, were not informed by the HET that new statements would form part of a \u2018pre-interview disclosure package\u2019 to solicitors representing soldiers. In a recent meeting with Dave Cox (HET Director), senior staff and the author, it was confirmed that new<\/span> witness statements are<\/span> included in the \u2018pre-interview disclosure package\u2019.[27]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n It is of considerable concern that there appears to be inequality in treatment where State agencies (in this case the military) are involved, compared to non-state or paramilitary suspects. There are examples in paramilitary related historic cases where suspects have received significantly less fulsome pre-interview disclosure.[28]<\/a> There is no clear rationale for this less favourable differentiation in treatment.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n When soldiers are interviewed under caution it is in the presence of their solicitor, recorded, and generally in his\/her offices. The soldiers are voluntary attendees. Under these circumstances the HET state that \u201cthey are treated as per the guidelines of the Police and Criminal Evidence (NI) Order.\u201d[29]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n An analysis of HET reports reveals that at the start of interviews soldiers present the HET with a pre-prepared written statement. These tend to be carefully crafted detailed statements which have benefited from the wide pre-interview disclosure package and several months preparation.\u00a0 Pre-interview disclosure is likely to have an effect of memory recall and\/or jogging memory. It appears that the value of soldiers\u2019 statements in terms of the level of additional information revealed (or answering unresolved questions) is limited. Statements tend to be a repetition of the original argument advanced in the RMP interview, but with any gaps carefully plugged, and some additional self-serving personal details about the individual. The process offers the soldier an opportunity to bolster his original statement and defence.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n The pre-prepared statements appear to depart from standard practice and procedures in a number of ways. The statement has the advantage of weeks or months in preparation, in advance of a HET formal interview.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n An analysis of a sample of case reports indicates that some HET interviews appear to lack robustness and inconsistencies are frequently not adequately challenged. By way of illustration, the following comments are taken from HET reports:<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u201cSoldier A accepted that he shot \u2018John\u2019 in the back, but was adamant that he was turning towards him when he fired. He said the fact that the exit wound had come out the front of his body at angle supported what he was saying.\u201d [John is not the victim\u2019s real name]<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n This statement does not appear to have been challenged and\/or followed up by the HET; if it was, it is not apparent in the report. <\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Another HET report states: \u201cThere are several differences in what Soldier D said to the RMP during the \u2018statement taking exercise\u2019 and what he told the HET in a formal interview under caution nearly 40 years later. A detailed critical comparison of a version of events recorded for one purpose against one given so long afterwards for an entirely different reason would, in the view of the HET, be invalid.\u201d<\/em><\/p>\n <\/p>\n It is not clear why the HET did not feel it valid to challenge the inconsistencies in statements; and why the purpose is described as \u201centirely different\u201d.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Importantly, the actual questions put to suspects and answers during HET interviews are not revealed. The content of interviews is edited by the HET and appears to be summarised; this will be addressed further below. In some instances the extent of the interview amounts to one page and a half in HET reports. The processes and procedures are not transparent.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n It is not clear how in one report the wording of an account given by a soldier to the HET, about his direct involvement in and recollection of a fatal shooting, changed in a redrafted report. The interview was not under caution and it was not recorded. The wording in the report is a summary based on a senior investigating officer\u2019s notes and recollection (or interpretation) of what was said during the interview. The following direct quotes from the original and redrafted report show changes which appear to legally bolster the soldier\u2019s defence.<\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n The direct quotes have been removed to protect the report\/victim from being identified.<\/span><\/p>\n \u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n It is not clear who directed the changes and what the process or procedures involved and what explanation there could be for changing it in this manner whether under caution or otherwise.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n \u00a0<\/strong><\/p>\n In response to a Freedom of Information Request,[30]<\/a> the HET confirmed that it does not have a written policy or a procedural document for identifying, tracing and interviewing soldiers involved in fatal shootings.[31]<\/a><\/p>\n <\/p>\n Decisions to interview under caution or not (for example) are made on a case by case basis. The senior HET officer heading up the RMP Cases Team appears to have sole responsibility for such decision making.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n There is no current Memorandum of Understanding between HET and MOD on matters pertaining to identification, tracing and conduct of interviews with military personnel.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n This raises concerns about standards and procedures, decision making and transparency.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Questions to be considered: <\/strong><\/p>\n Interviews under caution raise a number of concerns as indicated above; in particular that the investigation process and procedures appear to depart from accepted standards.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n 3. Accountability:<\/span><\/p>\n To comply with Article 2, investigations must be effective in order to secure accountability. The research raises questions about the HET process, the effectiveness of investigations and ability to hold the military to account. There are individual expressions of regret and\/or apologies from individual soldiers in HET reports.[32]<\/a> And, crucially, victims are frequently vindicated. The symbolism of apologies is important for many families; it provides a measure of acknowledgement. However individual expressions of regret or apology should not diminish the obligation to carry out impartial, effective and transparent investigations.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n Conclusion:<\/strong><\/p>\n There are many more issues raised by the research that require discussion but are outside the scope of this paper. The points above are the most salient for the purposes of this briefing. Of particular note are apparent anomalies and inconsistencies in the investigation process where the military is involved, compared to historic cases where non-state or paramilitary suspects are involved. The focus of the paper is the independent<\/span> team set up by the HET to examine all RMP cases. The team is made up of retired police officers from outside<\/span> Northern Ireland. This raises questions about the ability, and\/or perception, of the HET to undertake impartial, effective investigations in cases involving State agencies and the extent to which the families participating in the process are aware of departures from accepted procedures. Importantly, this raises concerns about the extent to which the HET\u2019s processes and procedures are compliant with Article 2. The perception of independence as well as its reality is critical as it impacts directly on the confidence of those who engage with the HET process. The author recommends that a more in depth investigation, with full access to HET policies, procedures and comparative reports, should be undertaken by the Criminal Justice Inspector for Northern Ireland.<\/p>\n <\/p>\n <\/p>\n Dr Patricia Lundy<\/p>\n Senior Lecturer<\/p>\n University of Ulster<\/p>\n Jordanstown<\/p>\n p.lundy@ulster.ac.uk<\/a><\/p>\n [1]<\/a> There is some evidence to suggest that RMP investigations may have extended beyond 1973.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [2]<\/a> FOI Request number F-2011-03623, received November 21, 2011, on file author. \u201c36 review summary reports have been delivered to families.\u201d Each victim\u2019s family receives a HET report detailing the nature of the review conducted and a response to unresolved questions raised by the family.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [3]<\/a> The sample of 24 HET reports is made up of 12 individual HET case reports completed between 2010 and 2011; a further 5 individual HET case reports completed in 2006-7; the remaining 7 reports are various drafts of recently completed reports. These reports are part of a much larger sample of HET reports collated by the author from 2006 to the present and cover all categories of deaths unionist civilian\/ nationalist civilian\/ paramilitary\/ security forces. The most recent HET report received by the author was December 2011. Interviews were also conducted with victims\u2019 families, NGOs and members of the legal profession.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [4]<\/a> It is not necessary to rehearse the obligations fully in this paper. See Lundy, P. (2009) Can the Past be Policed?: Lessons from the Historical Enquiries Team Northern Ireland, Law and Social Challenges, Vol.11, pp.133-138 download at http:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=1425445<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [5]<\/a> Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman)<\/p>\n The Hon William Hoyt OC, The Hon John Toohey AC, Volume 1X, HC29-IX, TSO, p.12-13, para 173.22-173.23. \u00a0A full transcript of the proceedings is available at http:\/\/www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk<\/span>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [6]<\/a> The \u2018RUC policy\u2019 is referred to in most of the HET RMP case reports examined.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [7]<\/a> Witness INQ2052, see also witness INQ1831, INQ3, a full transcript of the proceedings is available at http:\/\/www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org.uk<\/span>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [8]<\/a> Mrs Kathleen Thompson mother of six was killed 6 November 1971 by a British soldier of the Royal Green Jackets in disputed circumstances. See, Kerr.J, In the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland, Queen\u2019s Bench Division (Judicial Review), In the Matter of an Application by Mary Louise Thompson For Judicial Review, Ref:KERA3639T<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [9]<\/a> It is also worth noting that in accordance with the law and practice at the time inquests did not require attendance of soldiers involved in fatal shootings. Instead unsworn statements were usually produced as court exhibits. This meant that there was no opportunity for cross-examination. Thus, original inquests were held on the basis of information obtained from a flawed RMP investigation process, as evidenced by the Saville Inquiry and Sir Brian Kerr\u2019s judgement (2003) (see endnote 8 above). It is probable that some victims\u2019 families\u2019 will submit legal applications to the Attorney General (AG) requesting that he exercise his power under section 14 of the Coroners Act (NI) 1959 to order fresh inquests. Inquests must now comply with Article 2 of ECHR and British soldiers involved in fatal shootings are compellable witnesses.\u00a0 The AG has already ordered fresh inquests in the case of Daniel Hegarty and the \u2018Ballymurphy cases\u2019 (the latter involved the deaths of 11 civilians). There are over 150 RMP cases.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [10]<\/a> The NGOs in attendance included BIRW, CAJ, PFC, and also a legal representative and the author.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [11]<\/a> Credit for highlighting these issues, and the subsequent changes to HET reports that reveal inadequacies in RMP investigations should go to NGOs. Copy of minutes June 2007 NGO\/HET meeting, and PFC Position Paper, are on file with the author.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [12]<\/a> The information was in the public domain from 2000 onwards as a result of evidence given to the Saville Inquiry and Sir Brian Kerr\u2019s judgement in the Thompson case was available in 2003.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [13]<\/a> See Lundy, P. (2009) Can the Past be Policed?: Lessons from the Historical Enquiries Team Northern Ireland, Law and Social Challenges, Vol.11, pp.133-138 download at http:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=1425445<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [14]<\/a> HET, Position Paper, \u2018Identification, Tracing and Interviewing of Military Personnel\u2019, August 2007, copy on file with the author<\/p>\n<\/div>\n [15]<\/a> The research found that \u201ceach stage of the HET process had involvement of significant numbers of long serving retired RUC officers; this included the Command Team, senior managers of intelligence and the entire HET Intelligence Unit. In addition, at the time of the research, a former employee of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) who had been previously stationed in Northern Ireland during the conflict performed the role of Command Secretary, Information Manager and Specified Person of Contact with MoD.\u201d The research further noted; \u201cgiven the very high numbers of retired police officers working in the HET, a crucial matter seemingly overlooked is who has oversight responsibility.\u201d See, Lundy, P. (2009) Can the Past be Policed?: Lessons from the Historical Enquiries Team Northern Ireland, Law and Social Challenges, Vol.11, see especially pp.133-148, can be download at http:\/\/ssrn.com\/abstract=1425445<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n\n
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